The death in Zagreb early last week of former Jasenovac commandant Dinko Sakic is a strong reminder that Croatia is rapidly approaching the end of an important phase of its confrontation with its World War II history and the legacy of the NDH. I am referring, of course, to the period in which a democratic Croatia has the power and ability to prosecute Ustasha criminals. This only became possible in 1991 with the breakup of Yugoslavia, but relatively soon will no longer be possible as the last criminals die.

Sakic's death ended any speculation about him possibly [after President Mesic leaves office] being granted a pardon and now only one case remains which might result in a trial, that of former Pozega police chief Milivoj Asner. In mid-July, the Austrian authorities announced that he would undergo a new battery of physical and mental tests to determine whether he could be extradited to Croatia, but given Austria's abysmal record in recent years in terms of bringing Nazi war criminals to justice, the chances of Asner being tried are not outstanding. Assuming that he will, unfortunately, elude punishment, we are currently in a position to assess how Croatia has dealt with the issue of the prosecution of Ustasha criminals.

Although quite a few names of suspects came to light over the past seventeen years, only three cases reached the point of possible prosecution in Croatia, those of Sakic, Ivo Rojnica, the former Ustasha governor of Dubrovnik, and Milivoj Asner, all three of whom share several important characteristics. All three considered themselves ardent Croatian patriots and committed Ustasha. All three fled from Yugoslavia to escape prosecution by Belgrade, the first two to Argentina, the third to Austria. All three immediately renewed their ties to the homeland once it became independent and even became involved in public life. Sakic had various dealings with the government, Rojnica was almost named Croatian ambassador to Argentina and Asner even founded a political party, which ran in the national elections. Thus it is fair to conclude that apparently none of the three felt any fear of prosecution by democratic Croatia, a fact clearly demonstrated by their high public profile, which included publicized visits to Zagreb and lengthy interviews in the local media. (It is very probable that in this respect the aggressively nationalistic stance of President Tudjman reinforced their sense of security.)

Given these circumstances, it is fair to say that at least as far as Sakic and Asner are concerned, their newly-independent homeland did not live up to their expectations. On the contrary, the culmination of their political dreams, the independent Croatian nation-state with an overwhelming Croatian majority, indicted them for what they have again and again insisted were perfectly-legitimate political actions. In that respect, the irony of Sakic's successful prosecution (and punishment) in the capital of an independent Croatia by a Croatian panel of judges is simply impossible to ignore.

Having noted that, what has been the impact of the efforts to prosecute Ustasha criminals in democratic Croatia? One of the most important points in this regard has been the passive role of every Croatian government to date in seeking to uncover local Nazi collaborators. Not a single suspect was ever discovered by government prosecutors and/or investigators. In fact, each one of the three best cases was discovered and/or exposed by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, which had up to that point never exhibited any special expertise on Croatian crimes. Once the cases were publicized, however, the government was forced to deal with the evidence and respond to demands that the Ustasha criminals be prosecuted. (In this regard, it was clear, that aggressively looking for such criminals would have been extremely risky politically for any government.)

Once the criminals were found and exposed, I believe that three factors ultimately determined their fate: timing, the severity of the crimes and the extent of the evidence available to prove them and external factors related to national interests. By timing, I am referring to the age of the defendant and his physical and mental health. In that respect, Sakic who was discovered relatively-healthy in Argentina at the age of 76 was a far better candidate for prosecution than Asner who was only exposed (thanks to the research of Alen Budaj) in Croatia at 91. As far as the level of guilt and the extent of the evidence is concerned, Sakic again had the best potential. Not only had he commanded the "Auschwitz of the Balkans," but there were survivors of Jasenovac who had seen him personally commit murder. In the Rojnica and Asner cases, the charges were similar. Both were accused of persecuting members of minorities [Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies] and deporting them to concentration camps where they were murdered, but apparently the evidence from Pozega was stronger than that from Dubrovnik. As far as national interests were perceived, at the time that Sakic was caught, Croatia was badly in need of diplomatic support for its goals of NATO and EU membership. Achieving reconciliation with the Jews (via recognition by Israel and full diplomatic relations) was considered an important priority and Sakic's prosecution became a factor in this equation. This was no longer the case when the prosecution of Rojnica and Asner were under consideration. So why did Croatia seek the extradition of the latter but not of the former? We will never know for certain until the relevant documents become available, but I believe that the answer has to do with Rojnica's prominence and connections in the emigre Diaspora and the fact that by successfully convicting and punishing Sakic, Croatia had thereby already proven its Holocaust sensitivity credentials.

In conclusion, the results of democratic Croatia's efforts to prosecute Ustasha criminals have been mixed. On the one hand, the Sakic trial was undoubtedly the most successful and meaningful trial of a Nazi, in this case Ustasha, war criminal in post-Communist Europe, which explains its positive impact on the delegitimization of hard-core Ustasha ideology. On the other hand, the government has done very little to stress its importance and what a significant achievement it was. The fact that there is no mention of it in the new exhibition at Jasenovac is a scandal which only encourages outrageous comments like those made by the priest at Sakic's funeral, who called him a model for all Croatians. In addition, the government's passivity in pursuing other cases and its failure to seek the extradition of Rojnica sent an equivocal message which has only encouraged the kind of NDH nostalgia evident at Thompson concerts and on other issues.

With no other live suspects (except for Asner) left to prosecute, the battle for Croatia's soul will move to the classrooms, memorial sites, and the public arena, where the struggle for historical truth will no doubt continue for many years